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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 
This is an appeal of a five-level upward departure from 
the fraud sentencing guideline. In December 1999, John T. 
Jarvis pled guilty to one count of mail fraud in violation of 
18 U.S.C. SS 1341 and 1342. He admitted to participating 
in two separate fraudulent schemes that bilked investors of 
more than $880,000. The Presentence Investigation Report 
("PSR") set Jarvis' guideline sentencing range at 24 to 30 
months. However, after determining that Jarvis caused 
psychological injury to his victims and knowingly 
endangered their solvency, the district judge imposed a five- 
level upward departure and sentenced him to a 60-month 
prison term. On appeal, Jarvis claims that his conduct did 
not go beyond the heartland of typical fraud cases, and that 
the court misapplied the guidelines. We find no abuse of 
discretion and will therefore affir m. 
 
I. 
 
The charges against Jarvis arose fr om his employment 
with Penn Capital Financial Service ("Penn Capital"), a 
corporation registered as a broker -dealer with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. At his guilty plea 
hearing, Jarvis admitted that, from April 1989 to October 
1994, he knowingly participated in two separate fraudulent 
investment schemes, one involving the purchase, 
rehabilitation, and sale of public housing pr operty, and the 
other a fraudulent stock investment scheme concer ning 
Penn Capital stock. 
 
The total loss attributable to Jarvis for both schemes is 
$883,859. The total number of victims was 27.1 After 
discounting the monies returned to investors, the actual 
loss they sustained in both schemes amounted to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. There were 31 separate investments, but because several individuals 
invested in both fraudulent schemes, the total number of victims was 
27. 
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$316,743. However, no victim of the frauds who received 
money back was paid directly from funds of Jarvis or Penn 
Capital. Instead, the repayments were derived from other 
fraudulently obtained funds originating from other 
defrauded investors. 
 
For sentencing purposes, the PSR calculated Jarvis' 
adjusted offense level at 16. This offense level, combined 
with a criminal history category of II, gave Jarvis a 
guideline sentencing range of 24 to 30 months. Although 
victim impact statements had been received fr om 8 victims, 
the PSR did not recommend any victim-related adjustments 
in Jarvis' offense level, and neither Jarvis nor the 
Government objected to the PSR. On April 6, 2000, the 
District Court informed the parties that a two-level increase 
for abuse of a position of trust under U.S.S.G.S 3B1.3 
applied, and that a further two-level vulnerable victim 
enhancement under U.S.S.G. S 3A1.1 might be applicable.2 
 
A sentencing hearing was held on April 13 and 27, 2000, 
during which evidence relating to victim impact was 
obtained. The District Court heard testimony fr om several 
of Jarvis' victims. Nathan Patrick Hager testified that Jarvis 
had defrauded him and his wife of their entir e life savings, 
and all his retirement funds (about $207,000) while 
knowing that their only son was dying of cancer . According 
to Hager, Jarvis had promised a 9% r eturn on his 
investment and assured him that no loss was possible 
because the investment was guaranteed by the state. 
 
Sophie Palladini stated that she did not know Jarvis 
before he visited her home and introduced her to Penn 
Capital. Ultimately, the court found Jarvis r esponsible for 
her loss of $70,799. 
 
Michael Esper, who at the time was 79 years old, testified 
that Jarvis fraudulently induced him and his spouse to 
invest all of the money they had received fr om the sale of 
their home when they moved into an apartment. This 
apparently amounted to $80,000, which Jarvis guaranteed 
would be invested safely. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. All citations to the Sentencing Guidelines r efer to the 1998 edition, 
which was used in the PSR. 
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Additionally, the Government made an evidentiary proffer 
concerning the testimony of several other individuals who 
were present in the courtroom. Accor ding to the proffer, 
Anne Marie Kmonk would have testified that she was 57 
years old when she invested $219,371 with Jarvis and 
ultimately received back about $152,035 of her initial 
investment. She had also communicated directly with the 
sentencing court by letter, stating that she and her spouse 
had suffered health problems br ought on by Jarvis' 
fraudulent activities. 
 
Anne Wolas would have testified that she was 82 years 
old and that her loss from dealing with Jarvis was about 
$45,440. She also would have told the court that Jarvis 
had visited her home, that he could see that it was modest, 
and that it had a value of approximately $65,000. Finally, 
she would have testified that Jarvis induced her to invest in 
the fraudulent housing scheme by transferring money from 
a legitimate investment she had in VMS Vanguard 
Mortgage, representing to her that the housing investment 
was a branch of Vanguard. 
 
Finally, William Becker was prepar ed to testify that he 
was temporarily laid off in 1993, permanently in 1994, and 
was 52 years old when he retired. He r eportedly would have 
testified that, when he invested $8,000 in December 1993, 
he told Jarvis that he needed monthly income due to the 
layoff and that he received six inter est payment checks 
from Jarvis beginning in January 1994. The court 
eventually found that Becker would have lost his entire life 
savings of $170,000 had Jarvis succeeded in convincing 
him to invest it with Penn Capital. 
 
The District Court continued the sentencing hearing until 
April 27, 2000. Soon after, the court filed an order notifying 
the parties that it was considering an upwar d departure 
from the Sentencing Guideline range because Jarvis' 
conduct went beyond the heartland of typical fraud cases. 
 
Thereafter, when the sentencing hearing resumed, the 
court called Agnes Kato to testify about her losses. Kato 
stated that her son-in-law, John Palladini, had intr oduced 
her to Jarvis, and she subsequently invested appr oximately 
$9,000 in the fraudulent schemes. Jarvis told her she 
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would receive paperwork to document her investment, but 
she never did. The court then asked Kato if she had told 
Jarvis why she sought to save money, to which she 
responded that she had told him that she wanted the 
money to provide for the welfare of her son, who became 
disabled after a brain aneurysm. 
 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the District Court made 
the following determination: 
 
        The particular facts underlying defendant's criminal 
       conduct cannot be captured by the adjustments set 
       forth in the guidelines. Rather, defendant's predatory 
       conduct and the reasonably foreseeable consequences 
       of his action undoubtedly remove this case fr om the 
       heartland of fraud cases addressed in the guidelines. 
       Accordingly, the Court finds that an upwar d departure 
       is warranted. 
 
Following this finding, the court first imposed a four-point 
enhancement to Jarvis' offense level for abuse of trust and 
vulnerable victims. Based on the PSR's adjusted of fense 
level of 16, this resulted in an offense level of 20. Jarvis 
does not challenge these enhancements. 
 
This appeal results from the District Court's subsequent 
imposition of a further five-level upward departure on two 
grounds suggested in the commentary to the fraud 
guideline: (1) that "the offense caused reasonably 
foreseeable[ ] physical or psychological harm or severe 
emotional trauma," U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1, comment. n.11(c), 
and (2) that "the offense involved the knowing 
endangerment of the solvency of one or mor e victims," 
U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1, comment. n.11(f). The court also invoked 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.3, which addresses extr eme psychological 
injury, as additional support for this five-level upward 
departure. This increased Jarvis' of fense level from 20 to 
25, which, combined with his criminal history category of 
II, resulted in a guideline range of 63 to 78 months. The 
District Court sentenced Jarvis to 60 months of 
incarceration after applying the statutory maximum 
applicable to each of the three counts in the indictment. 
The court also imposed three years of supervised release, 
and ordered Jarvis to pay $316,743 in r estitution. 
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A sentencing court's decision to depart from an 
applicable guideline range is generally entitled to 
substantial deference and hence is subject to r eview for an 
abuse of discretion. Koon v. United States , 518 U.S. 81, 98- 
100 (1996). Factual findings are reviewed for clear error. 
See 18 U.S.C. S 3742(e); United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 
226, 242-43 (3d Cir. 2000). Whether " `the facts found by 
the district court warrant application of a particular 
guideline provision is a legal question and is to be reviewed 
de novo.' " United States v. Wilson , 106 F.3d 1140, 1142-43 
(3d Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Partington, 21 F.3d 
714, 717 (6th Cir. 1994)). 
 
II. 
 
Jarvis initially contends that the District Court lacked 
the authority to depart upward from the guideline range on 
the basis of psychological injury and knowing 
endangerment of victim solvency. We r eject this contention. 
Certainly, the Sentencing Guidelines allow a sentencing 
judge to take note of the consequences of a fraud scheme 
that extends beyond the immediate financial loss. The 
sentencing judge may depart from the guidelines if the 
judge finds that "there exists an aggravating or mitigating 
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately 
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in 
formulating the guidelines." 18 U.S.C.S 3553(b). Further, 
where "the [monetary] loss . . . does not fully capture the 
harmfulness and seriousness of the conduct, an upward 
departure may be warranted." U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1, comment. 
n.11. Specifically mentioned as factors outside the 
heartland of the fraud guideline are "r easonably foreseeable 
. . . psychological harm or severe emotional trauma" and 
the "knowing endangerment of the solvency of one or more 
victims." U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1, comment. nn.11(c), (f); see also 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.3 (policy statement authorizing departure 
for extreme psychological injury). 
 
III. 
 
We next address whether the District Court was justified 
in upwardly departing based on at least one victim having 
 
                                6 
  
suffered psychological harm. The commentary to the fraud 
guideline states, "In cases in which the loss determined 
under subsection (b)(1) does not fully captur e the 
harmfulness and seriousness of the conduct, an upward 
departure may be warranted. Examples may include the 
following: . . . . (c) the offense caused r easonably 
foreseeable, physical or psychological har m or severe 
emotional trauma . . . ." U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1, comment. n.11. 
The Sentencing Commission has also provided a policy 
statement delineating when severe emotional trauma falls 
outside the heartland: "If a victim or victims suffered 
psychological injury much more serious than that normally 
resulting from commission of the of fense, the court may 
increase the sentence above the authorized guideline 
range." U.S.S.G. S 5K2.3 (emphasis added). Section 5K2.3 
further provides that an upward departur e for psychological 
injury may be imposed: 
 
       only when there is a substantial impair ment of the 
       intellectual, psychological, emotional, or behavioral 
       functioning of a victim, when the impairment is likely 
       to be of an extended or continuous duration, and when 
       the impairment manifests itself by physical or 
       psychological symptoms or by changes in behavior 
       patterns. The court should consider the extent to 
       which such harm was likely, given the natur e of the 
       defendant's conduct. 
 
Id. 
 
Jarvis contends that the District Court erred in upwardly 
departing because the evidence and factual findings were 
insufficient to establish that any of the victims suffered any 
psychological injury. We disagree. In its ruling, the District 
Court made specific findings of fact that wer e necessary to 
its guideline disposition: 
 
       [D]efendant's victims include blue collar workers who 
       had worked hard and saved many years to be able to 
       enjoy their retirement. Some of those who lost very 
       large sums had acquired the money thr ough their 
       retirement such as a pension fund; another through 
       the sale of the family home. Due to the defendant's 
       conduct, many of his victims will be forced to live their 
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       retirement years in destitution. Defendant has taken 
       away the security and comforts that his victims' 
       lifetime of hard work would have otherwise pr ovided 
       them. Defendant intentionally took money from people 
       whom he knew to be of or near advanced age and who 
       were uneducated investors, convincing them to hand 
       over their entire life savings and retir ement funds. 
 
        Defendant's actions resulted in for eseeable 
       psychological harm, severe emotional trauma, and 
       involved the knowing endangerment of the solvency of 
       one or more of his victims. 
 
        Mr. and Mrs. Nathan Hager are curr ently on 
       depression medication and see a mental health 
       professional in order to deal with their losses. 
 
        Many victims, including Anna Marie and Thomas 
       Kmonk, have lost their entire savings with little hope of 
       regaining financial security. 
 
        There is a distinction between defrauding a thirty- 
       year old of his life savings and defrauding a sixty-year 
       old of his life savings. Defendant could for esee the 
       unlikelihood of his victims recouping their loss. 
 
        . . . . 
 
        In over twenty years as a judge on the bench, this is 
       one of the most egregious cases of fraud that this 
       Court has seen. The loss calculation determined under 
       Section 2F1.1 of the guidelines does not fully capture 
       the harmfulness and seriousness of the defendant's 
       conduct. 
 
        Further, this harmfulness and seriousness is not 
       adequately addressed by the enhancements for a 
       vulnerable victim and more than minimal planning. 
       While the victim of any fraud would certainly 
       experience emotional distress upon the r ealization that 
       their money was gone, the psychological harm caused 
       by defendant was much more serious than that which 
       would normally be experienced by a fraud victim. To 
       steal the means by which persons worked to support 
       themselves in their retirement years, to take the money 
       that an elderly couple realized at the sale of their 
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       largest asset, the family home, to take a couple's 
       savings at the same time they are forced to bury their 
       only child, to take an elderly woman's savings meant to 
       secure a funeral for her disabled son, subjected the 
       defendant's victims to psychological injury which 
       exceeds that which could be expected in a run of the 
       mill fraud case. 
 
        Defendant knew of his victims' circumstances and he 
       certainly would have foreseen the effects his actions 
       would have upon his victims. Defendant's fraudulent 
       actions ended in 1994 and yet, this was when his 
       victims' nightmares were only beginning. 
 
        As evidenced by the presence of the victims in this 
       courtroom and the letters submitted to this Court, 
       defendant's victims continue to suffer fr om his actions, 
       desperately seeking to regain some of the money that 
       they have lost and with it some comfort in their 
       retirement. 
 
        The particular facts underlying defendant's criminal 
       conduct cannot be captured by the adjustments set 
       forth in the guidelines. Rather, defendant's predatory 
       conduct and the reasonably foreseeable consequences 
       of his action undoubtedly remove this case fr om the 
       heartland of fraud cases addressed in the guidelines. 
       Accordingly, the Court finds that an upwar d departure 
       is warranted.3 
 
The District Court's findings are not clearly erroneous, and 
under our de novo review we agree with the court's 
application of those facts to the guidelines. Jarvis' 
fraudulent scheme caused several victims to suf fer severe 
emotional trauma sufficient to justify an upwar d departure 
for conduct outside the heartland of the fraud sentencing 
guideline. We have previously ruled that"[w]here any one 
victim suffers substantial impairment, departure is justified 
under section 5K2.3." United States v. Astorri, 923 F.2d 
1052, 1059 (3d Cir. 1991). That standar d is satisfied in this 
case, where the District Court found that "Mr. and Mrs. 
Nathan Hager are currently on depr ession medication and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. App. at 144-48. 
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see a mental health professional in order to deal with their 
losses." This finding is supported by Mrs. Hager's letter to 
the court dated April 22, 2000, in which she wr ote that 
"[m]y husband and I are on depression medicine and seeing 
a shrink. (Dr.) The medicine is so expensive." While some 
level of depression might be thought common to all fraud 
victims, the condition the Hagers suffer ed was severe 
enough to require them to seek professional mental health 
care and to take medication. Thus, the depr ession the 
Hagers describe is consistent with the terms of U.S.S.G. 
S 2F1.1, comment. n.11(c), and meets the plain meaning of 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.3, which permits an upwar d departure for 
psychological harm that is "much mor e serious than that 
normally resulting from commission of the offense." 
 
We also disagree with Jarvis' contention that the District 
Court could not have found that the Hagers' depr ession "is 
likely to be of an extended or continuous duration," as 
required by S 5K2.3. The Hagers' son died from cancer on 
December 22, 1994. Their letter to the court dated April 22, 
2000 stated that Jarvis and his associates had "wiped us 
out 2 days after I buried him." Thus, the Hagers suffered 
from significant depression more than five years after 
Jarvis' scheme. This is confirmed by Mrs. Hager's April 22, 
2000 letter, in which she writes: "I have prayed and prayed 
over the (5) years finding no solution to this pr oblem." In 
sum, the record sufficiently establishes that the Hagers 
suffered "a chronic substantial impairment of [their] mental 
functioning resulting in physical, psychological or 
behavioral symptoms," justifying a S 5K2.3 upward 
departure. Astorri, 923 F.2d at 1059. 
 
Jarvis argues that the District Court err ed by attributing 
the Hagers' mental health problems to his scheme while 
overlooking that those problems were caused by the 
contemporaneous death of their only son from cancer. This 
contention ignores Mrs. Hager's letter, which is replete with 
references to the health problems the couple suffered as a 
result of Jarvis' fraud -- not the death of their son. She 
wrote, for instance, that "[i]t has been a struggle to keep 
going with the stress of th[e] financial problems we are 
having and [a lot] of health problems." Moreover, in the six- 
page letter she refers to her son and his death only twice. 
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One of those references stated that Jarvis and his 
associates at Penn Capital "wiped us out 2 days after I 
buried him. They knew he was dying."4  These references 
support the District Court's enhancement because they 
underscore the fact that Jarvis could r easonably foresee the 
devastating impact his fraud would have on the Hagers as 
a result of their ordeal with their son's cancer. 
 
Further, the Hagers' health problems ar e similar to those 
in Astorri, where we upheld an upwar d departure pursuant 
to S 5K2.3 for severe psychological har m. There, three sets 
of financial fraud victims were identified as having suffered 
physical or psychological injury. The evidence showed that 
one victim had been forced to obtain high blood pressure 
treatment, and another, who had alr eady been in poor 
health, "displayed adverse physical and behavioral effects." 
Astorri, 923 F.3d at 1058-59. The physical or psychological 
health effects on the third set of victims were not described, 
apart from the district court judge noting that she had 
observed the effects being manifested during the trial. See 
id. at 1058. On that record, we deter mined that the District 
Court's findings, that at least the first two victims "suffered 
extreme psychological injury," were not clearly erroneous. 
Id. at 1059. Similarly, the Hagers' documented mental 
health problems, which required them to obtain 
professional care and take medication even years after the 
fraud occurred, adequately supports a finding that they 
suffered extreme psychological injury. 
 
The District Court had other evidence upon which to 
conclude that an upward departure for severe psychological 
injury was warranted. Anne Marie Kmonk wrote to the 
District Court that "[i]t is now five years, I am 57 years 
old[,] have had health problems (myself and my husband) I 
believe brought on by this stressful situation, and wanted 
to begin my retirement." Evidence fr om Sophie Palladini 
was also relevant. Although Jarvis was not dir ectly 
responsible for defrauding her, the District Court found him 
at least partly responsible because he intr oduced her to 
Penn Capital and he should have foreseen that she would 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In her second reference to her son, Mrs. Hager wrote: "I have lost my 
son, [a lot] of money, many friends, and almost my faith in God." 
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be victimized by the fraudulent scams taking place there. 
Palladini wrote the court that "all the years for the [loss] of 
this money emotionally it was very bad and still is." On 
another occasion she wrote that "[m]y nerves have put me 
in the hospital over this." 
 
Jarvis relies on our decision in United States v. Neadle, 
72 F.3d 1104 (3d Cir. 1996), to ar gue that an upward 
departure for severe psychological har m was not justified. 
There, we reversed a district court's upward departure for 
the psychological and social harm imposed on the people of 
the Virgin Islands when an insurance company the 
defendant had created fraudulently obtained an insurance 
license but was subsequently unable to meet its claim 
obligations after Hurricane Hugo. See id. at 1106, 1111-12. 
The completely speculative grounds upon which the 
adjustment was applied in Neadle to an entir e population is 
wholly distinguishable from the recor d presented in this 
case, which shows discrete instances of sever e 
psychological trauma with respect to several specific 
individuals. 
 
The other cases upon which Jarvis relies ar e either 
distinguishable or appear at odds with the rule in Astorri 
that a S 5K2.3 upward departure is justified whenever one 
victim suffers severe psychological har m. In United States v. 
Pelkey, the First Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that 
the emotional trauma, including depression, r esulting from 
a fraud was inadequate to uphold an upward departure 
under S 5K2.3. See 29 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 1994). Pelkey, 
however, can be distinguished because ther e was no 
evidence that any victim needed treatment. Id. By contrast, 
the Hagers did require treatment. Mor eover, given the law 
of this circuit, Pelkey is a questionable decision to the 
extent that it found insufficient evidence despite the fact 
that a victim reportedly experienced moments of extreme 
despair leading to suicidal ideations. See id.  In United 
States v. Mandel, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals also 
reversed an upward departure based upon severe 
psychological harm. See 991 F.2d 55, 58-59 (2d Cir. 1993). 
However, whether the same decision would have been 
reached in this circuit is questionable because the evidence 
there showed that, after the shock of lear ning about the 
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fraud, one victim lost her job and needed to see a therapist, 
stopping only when she could no longer affor d it. See id. at 
58. Thus, Mandel also appears inconsistent with our rule 
that a S 5K2.3 upward departure may be applied when at 
least one victim suffers severe psychological injury. 
 
We conclude, therefore, that the District Court's factual 
findings are not clearly erroneous, and we are satisfied that 
the District Court's application of the facts to the 
sentencing guidelines was justified. Thus, we will affirm the 
upward departure for psychological injury. 
 
IV. 
 
We now turn to whether the District Court abused its 
discretion in upwardly departing for knowing endangerment 
of victim solvency. The fraud guideline encourages 
heartland departures when a defrauding party endangers 
the solvency of at least one victim. "In cases in which the 
loss determined under subsection (b)(1) does not fully 
capture the harmfulness and seriousness of the conduct, 
an upward departure may be warranted. Examples may 
include the following: . . . the offense involved the knowing 
endangerment of the solvency of one or mor e victims." 
U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1, comment. n.11(f). 
 
Jarvis argues that the District Court abused its 
discretion because (1) some of its findings regarding the 
victims' financial condition were clearly err oneous, and 
(2) the remaining findings were insufficient to sustain the 
departure because no victim was actually r endered 
insolvent. The Government disagrees, ar guing that an 
upward departure is warranted if the evidence indicates an 
endangering risk of insolvency, a standard that it alleges is 
met on this record. Thus, the primary point of dispute is 
whether the relevant standard requir es a showing of actual 
insolvency or merely the potential of insolvency. We agree 
with the Government on this issue. 
 
Admittedly, Jarvis arguably has at least one precedent 
favoring his position that actual insolvency is the relevant 
inquiry. In a footnote in United States v. Pelkey, the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "[a] departure based on 
[the ground of knowing endangerment of victim solvency] 
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requires a court to find that a defendant knowingly pushed 
a victim into extreme financial hardship." 29 F.3d at 15 
n.5. 
 
However, the propriety of Jarvis' suggested actual 
insolvency standard is highly questionable given the plain 
language of the fraud guideline's application note 11(f). 
That note refers to "knowing endanger ment" of solvency. 
"Endangerment" necessarily refers to potentiality. For 
example, a common definition of "endanger" is "to bring 
into danger or peril of probable har m or loss." Webster's 
New Int'l Dictionary 748 (3d ed. 1993) (emphasis added). 
Thus, the Sentencing Commission's language appears to 
indicate a concern with knowingly exposing a victim to a 
significant risk of insolvency. Its language is not consistent 
with a requirement of actual insolvency, which is the 
standard that Jarvis embraces and Pelkey  arguably 
endorsed. 
 
Other than Pelkey, every other court of appeals that has 
addressed the issue of endangerment of victim solvency has 
applied a potentiality standard instead of the one Jarvis 
advocates. See United States v. Hogan, 121 F .3d 370, 373 
(8th Cir. 1997) (noting serious endanger ment to solvency, 
as opposed to actual insolvency); United States v. Ross, 77 
F.3d 1525, 1533-36, 1551 (7th Cir. 1996) (referring to "[t]he 
extreme risk of victim insolvency in this case" and that "the 
crushing weight of . . . student loans spelled almost certain 
insolvency");5 see also United States v. Kaye, 23 F.3d 50, 
51-53 (2d Cir. 1994) (upholding upwar d adjustment for 
rendering victim "financially dependent on the generosity of 
others, quite possibly for the rest of her life," despite the 
fact that the victim, who was defrauded of $893,700, had 
$180,995 returned and spent $40,000 "in an effort to 
recoup her losses"). 
 
Consistent with the majority trend, we conclude that an 
upward departure for knowing endanger ment of victim 
solvency is appropriate when a preponderance of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In Ross, the guideline language concer ning knowing endangerment of 
victim solvency was identical to that which pr esently exists, but at the 
time was codified at application note 10(f) to U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1. See 77 
F.3d at 1551. 
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evidence demonstrates that a defendant knew, or should 
have known, that the fraud potentially endanger ed the 
victim's solvency. Actual insolvency is not r equired. This 
standard may be satisfied even where the risk is limited to 
the victim's liquid assets. See Kaye, 23 F .3d at 51. 
 
The facts presented in this case meet that standard. 
Jarvis fraudulently divested Wolas of her liquid assets, 
amounting to $45,444.6 Jarvis ar gues that he did not 
endanger Wolas' solvency because she r etained at least one 
known significant asset, a house worth $65,000. W e reject 
this argument. Solvency should be consider ed primarily in 
terms of liquid assets so that a defrauding party cannot 
escape a higher sentence, based on the mere fortuity that 
his victim retains an asset such as a home, where the 
victim's ability to remain in the home is sever ely 
undermined due to the fraud. See id. (affirming upward 
departure under S 2F1.1 for extent offinancial loss where 
victim was deprived "of most if not all of her liquid assets, 
leaving her to rely on the generosity of others, quite 
possibly for the rest of her life") (emphasis added). 
 
In addition, the preponderance of the evidence in this 
case showed that Jarvis knowingly endangered the solvency 
of other victims. He knew, for instance, that he was 
endangering the solvency of Nathan Hager, who invested all 
of the proceeds he received upon leaving his employer 
(approximately $207,000) with Penn Capital. Although 
Jarvis invested this money in legitimate mutual funds, he 
knew that he was potentially endangering Hager's solvency 
by encouraging Hager to invest with Penn Capital. Jarvis' 
recognition of this risk is demonstrated by the testimony of 
Scott Lindstrom, a Penn Capital broker fr om May 1993 to 
January 1995, who stated that, after Jarvis left Penn 
Capital, Jarvis asked Lindstrom to contact the Hagers and 
warn them to get their money back and not make future 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. This is the amount the District Court or dered Jarvis to pay in 
restitution to Wolas. Wolas herself described her losses as larger in a 
letter dated December 23, 1999: "It is to my gr eat sorrow that I have 
lost 
$55,000 plus all interest that I could have r eceived from the last six 
years. This represents the savings that my husband and I counted on to 
get us through our old age. There is no chance that we will be able to 
save enough money to make up for this tremendous loss." 
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investments with Penn Capital. However, by the time 
Lindstrom contacted the Hagers, another Penn Capital 
broker had induced them to liquidate their legitimate 
mutual funds and invest in the fraudulent investment 
products. Ultimately, the investment led to Nathan Hager's 
loss of his "life savings plus [his] life's pension of thirty 
years." Although Jarvis was not held responsible for this 
loss, the District Court did not err in considering it as 
relevant sentencing information. See  U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3(a) 
(offense level is to be determined on the basis of (1) all acts 
and omissions aided, abetted, and induced, and (2) in the 
case of jointly undertaken criminal activity, "all reasonably 
foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of 
the jointly undertaken criminal activity," and (3) all 
resulting harm from those acts or omissions). 
 
Jarvis also knowingly risked endangering the solvency of 
Becker. Although Becker invested only $8,000 with Jarvis, 
the evidence established that Jarvis had attempted to 
induce Becker to invest his $170,000 retir ement account 
with Penn Capital. It was only because Becker had r esisted 
and chose instead to invest that money with a r eputable 
investment firm that he had not lost it to Penn Capital's 
fraudulent schemes. 
 
In sum, we are satisfied that the District Court's upward 
departure for knowing endangerment of victim solvency was 
justified.7 
 
V. 
 
Having decided that the grounds upon which the District 
Court decided to upwardly depart were valid, we finally 
turn to Jarvis' claim that the extent of the departure was 
unreasonable. See 18 U.S.C. S 3742(e)(3). Our review: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Jarvis correctly points out that the District Court erred in finding 
that 
"Anne Marie and Thomas Kmonk[ ] have lost their entire life savings with 
little hope of regaining financial security." The record indicates that, 
although the Kmonks had invested $219,371.64 in the Housing Fund 
and stock schemes with Jarvis and Penn Capital, they received back 
$152,035 by operation of the fraud scheme. However , this sole factual 
error in the context of the other factual findings, by the District Court, 
does not vitiate our upholding the upward departure in this case. 
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       looks to the amount and extent of the departur e in 
       light of the grounds for departing. In assessing 
       reasonableness . . . court of appeals [ar e] to examine 
       the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence 
       under the Guidelines, as well as the district court's 
       stated reasons for the imposition of the particular 
       sentence. A sentence thus can be "reasonable" even if 
       some of the reasons given by the district court to 
       justify the departure from the presumptive guideline 
       range are invalid, provided that the r emaining reasons 
       are sufficient to justify the magnitude of the departure. 
 
Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203-04 (1992) 
(citation omitted). 
 
Here, the District Court applied a five-level upward 
departure based upon the combined factors of severe 
psychological injury and knowing endangerment of victim 
solvency. We note that the District Court lumped the two 
bases (psychological injury and victim insolvency) into one 
overall departure of five levels, ther eby making it difficult to 
examine whether the extent of the departure on each basis 
was reasonable. 
 
Nevertheless, the District Court would have been well 
within its discretion in upwardly departing four levels based 
upon combining the factors of severe psychological injury 
and knowing endangerment of victim solvency. W e have 
previously approved a two-level upwar d departure for 
severe psychological injury under S 5K2.3 under 
circumstances somewhat similar to those in Jarvis' case. 
See United States v. Astorri, 923 F.2d 1052, 1058-59 (3d 
Cir. 1991). As for knowing endangerment of victim solvency 
under S 2F1.1, comment. n.11(f), another court of appeals 
has approved a two level upward departur e on that ground 
under circumstances that are comparable to those in 
Jarvis' case. See United States v. Hogan, 121 F.3d 370, 373 
(8th Cir. 1997). 
 
We need not decide whether application of the one 
additional level was erroneous because Jarvis effectively 
received a three or four level upwar d departure. Despite 
Jarvis' ultimate guideline range of 63 to 78 months, the 
court actually sentenced Jarvis to the lower 60-month 
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8. Adjusted offense levels of 23 and 24 (instead of the 25 Jarvis 
received) 
would yield, respectively, guideline ranges of 51-63 and 57-71 months. 
See U.S.S.G., ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table). 
statutory maximum imprisonment term. The dif ference 
between Jarvis' final guideline range and his actual 
sentence worked to reduce the District Court's effective 
upward departure: a three or four level upward departure 
would leave Jarvis with a guideline range in which a 60 
month sentence could be imposed based on his criminal 
history category of II.8 Since a four-level departure would 
have been fully within the District Court's discr etion, no 
error occurred and no remand is necessary. "If the party 
defending the sentence persuades the court of appeals that 
the district court would have imposed the same sentence 
absent the erroneous factor, then a r emand is not required 
. . . and the court of appeals may affirm the sentence as 
long as it is also satisfied that the departur e is reasonable 
. . . ." Williams, 503 U.S. at 203. 
 
VI. 
 
       For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District 
Court's sentence. 
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BECKER, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURRING IN THE 
JUDGMENT. 
 
There can be no doubt, based upon the way in which he 
treated his victims, that John Jarvis is a despicable person 
who deserved to have "the book thrown at him." It therefore 
seems difficult, at first blush, to take issue with Judge 
Fuentes' forceful opinion affirming the upward adjustments 
to Jarvis' base offense level under the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines. But the Guidelines ar e a carefully 
reticulated set of regulations whose animating goal is the 
elimination of the former regime in which a judge could 
react to such terrible conduct by simply imposing a harsh 
sentence or, conversely, reward a felon with an otherwise 
exemplary background by "giving him a br eak." The 
Guidelines establish instead a regime under which: (1) 
harms are quantified through car eful legal definition; and 
(2) a range of punishments derived from those definitions is 
prescribed, subject to a variety of guided departures that 
depend on objective judicial findings that must be 
consonant with the Guidelines' terms. Most importantly, 
sentencing judges are not free to ignor e the strictures of the 
Guidelines, however untoward they deem the r esult. 
 
Principally at issue here is Guideline S 5K2.3, a guided 
departure provision, which authorizes the sentencing court 
to increase the sentence above the normal Guideline range 
if a victim suffered "psychological injury much more serious 
than that normally resulting from commission of the 
offense." The section goes on to explicate this standard as 
follows: 
 
       Normally, psychological injury would be sufficiently 
       severe to warrant application of this adjustment only 
       when there is a substantial impairment of the 
       intellectual, psychological, emotional, or behavioral 
       functioning of a victim, when the impairment is likely 
       to be of an extended or continuous duration, and when 
       the impairment manifests itself by physical or 
       psychological symptoms or by changes in behavior 
       patterns. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.3. 
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The Guidelines text imposes a rigorous standar d of proof, 
and for good reason. Fraud offenses that involve duping 
people out of their life's savings will usually cause 
psychological injury; the greater the loss to the victim, the 
greater the probable injury. The Guidelines capture most of 
the harm from fraud offenses by incrementally increasing 
the sentencing range in accord with the amount of money 
involved, see U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(1), or by enhancing the 
sentencing range for vulnerable victims, see U.S.S.G. 
S 3A1.1(b). Thus, in S 5K2.3 the Commission apparently 
wanted to be quite specific as to the showing needed for a 
psychological injury enhancement so as not to duplicate 
these other factors. 
 
I do not believe that the evidence upon which the District 
Court imposed the substantial upward adjustment for 
psychological harm meets the rigorous standard of the 
Guidelines, which in essence requires r eliable evidence. 
More specifically, I believe that neither the uncorroborated 
letter from Mr. & Mrs. Hager that they are on depression 
medication and are "seeing a shrink," nor the 
uncorroborated and vague letter from Anna Marie Kmonk 
relating that she and her husband "have had health 
problems . . . I believe brought on by this stressful 
situation" provides the reliable evidence of psychological 
injury "much more serious than that nor mally resulting" 
from the offense that is requir ed by S 5K2.3. Furthermore, 
these letters are the strongest pieces of evidence in the 
Government's case; there is nothing comparable respecting 
the other victims. 
 
The majority's conclusion that these letters meet the 
S 5K2.3 test is grounded on our opinion in United States v. 
Astorri, 923 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1991), in which, based on 
quite similar evidence, the panel affirmed the District 
Court's upward adjustment for psychological har m. 
Because I agree with the majority that Astorri controls, I am 
constrained to join in the judgment of the Court. 1 I write 
separately because I believe that Astorri was wrongly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. I note in this regard my agr eement with the segment of Judge Fuentes' 
opinion dealing with the upward adjustment for knowing endangerment 
of the victim(s) solvency. 
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decided; my hope is to persuade the Court to take up this 
case en banc to overrule Astorri, or better still, to convince 
the Sentencing Commission to revise S 5K2.3 so as to 
clarify it and make clear that cases of this genr e do not 
justify an upward adjustment. 
 
Astorri involved a fact pattern very similar to that in the 
case at bar: the defendant was convicted of defrauding 
unsuspecting investors, including many elderly persons 
who thereby lost much or all of their life savings.2 As in this 
case, the district court adjusted upward the base offense 
level for fraud to account for the amount involved in the 
fraud under U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1, and added a two-level 
enhancement for vulnerable victims under S 3A1.1. The 
important adjustment in Astorri for our purposes was the 
district court's two-level upward departur e under S 5K2.3 
for the extreme psychological injury inflicted on the victims 
of the fraud. When the defendant appealed, the panel 
majority upheld the departure based on two factors: (1) the 
district court had gauged the effects on the victims from its 
observations at trial; and (2) two of the fraud victims had 
suffered physical and behavioral manifestations of their 
psychological injury, thus meeting the requir ements of 
S 5K2.3. As the Court put it: "Mrs. Needles has been forced 
to seek treatment for high blood pressur e as a result of 
Astorri's scheme. She continues to be under a doctor's care. 
. . . Record evidence reveals that Mr . Taylor, already in poor 
health, displayed adverse physical and behavioral ef fects 
from those dealings." 923 F.2d at 1059. The basis for these 
conclusions about the physical effects felt by the victims 
was two uncorroborated letters, one written by Mr. Taylor's 
attorney, and one written by the Needles themselves. 
 
I believe that this upward adjustment in Astorri was 
improper because it was not founded on r eliable evidence, 
and was not demonstrably justified by psychological injury 
"much more serious than that nor mally resulting from 
commission of the offense." U.S.S.G. S 5K2.3 (emphasis 
added). My point of departure is the dissenting opinion in 
Astorri of my late respected colleague, Judge William D. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In another--and odd--bit of similarity between these two cases, both 
Astorri and Jarvis dated daughters of their fraud victims. 
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Hutchinson. Indeed, the best way to make my point is to 
quote (at some length) Judge Hutchinson's wor ds: 
 
        The evidence about the effect Astorri's fraud had on 
       the Taylors and the Needles' health is insufficient to 
       support the district court's conclusion that some of the 
       victims suffered the kind of substantial and permanent 
       physical, intellectual or behavioral impairments that 
       Guidelines S 5K2.3 requires befor e an upward 
       departure for extreme psychological injury is 
       authorized. These unsupported lay statements ar e not 
       reliable evidence of the kind requir ed to support 
       enhancement of a guidelines sentence. See, e.g., United 
       States v. Sciarrino, 884 F.2d 95 (3d Cir .) (while hearsay 
       is permissible in determining a guidelines sentence, it 
       must have some degree of reliability), cert. denied, 493 
       U.S. 997, 110 S. Ct. 553, 107 L.Ed. 2d 549 (1989). 
 
        Likewise, I think the sentencing judge's own 
       observations that the psychological trauma naturally 
       resulting from the economic losses Astorri's fraud 
       visited upon his victims and his profound betrayal of 
       the Kronyaks and their daughter is insufficient to show 
       objective symptoms of substantial and continuous 
       intellectual, psychological, emotional or behavioral 
       impairment. Those observations are conclusions that 
       must be founded on reliable evidence under the 
       guidelines. They are not themselves evidence. 
 
        Perhaps determinations of crime's effect on its 
       victims would have been better left to the observations 
       and sound discretion of the sentencing judge, but 
       Congress has decided otherwise. See Mistr etta v. United 
       States, 488 U.S. 361, 109 S. Ct. 647, 652, 102 L.Ed. 
       2d 714 (1989). The Sentencing Commission has acted 
       to implement Congress's decision when it confined the 
       sentencing judge to a relatively narrow sentence range 
       objectively determined on the basis of r eliable evidence 
       that particular effects accompany a particular crime. 
       Even in departures, where a fairly lar ge element of 
       discretion is retained, facts grounded on reliable 
       evidence must show that one of the reasons for 
       departure is present. 
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        I do not doubt that a person suffers psychologically 
       when he loses his life's savings, let alone his home. 
       However, I believe any economic loss a victim suffers is 
       otherwise adequately taken into account under 
       Guidelines S 2F1.1(b)(1)(H), adjusting the of fense level 
       for the amount of monetary loss. Likewise, I believe 
       that the age of the victim is taken into account under 
       Guidelines S 3A1.1, relating to vulnerable victims, a 
       section which the district court correctly applied to 
       enhance Astorri's sentence. 
 
        Astorri's conduct demonstrates a heartless 
       willingness to trade on the affection of the woman he 
       had promised to marry and the trust she and her 
       parents placed in him while he secretly plundered the 
       savings her parents had reserved against their old age. 
       The common understanding of men and women of 
       every time and place condemns Astorri as a despicable 
       cad. However, the Sentencing Commission has taken 
       Astorri's truly outrageous and cynical manipulation of 
       his fiancee's family for his own private gain into 
       consideration in Guidelines S 3A1.1, r elating to 
       vulnerable victims, and Guidelines S 3B1.3, r elating to 
       abuse of trust. 
 
        Guidelines S 5K2.3 focuses elsewher e in permitting 
       enhancement for extreme psychological suf fering. 
       There is no reliable evidence in this r ecord to show 
       such an injury. Although the evidence here is sufficient 
       to support the district court's finding that Astorri's 
       victims were vulnerable and to show that his scheme 
       included the elements of an abuse of trust, it was not 
       sufficient to show any of Astorri's victims suf fered 
       "extreme psychological injury" and so per mit 
       enhancement of his sentence under S 5K2.3. 
 
923 F.2d at 1061-62 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting). 
 
I agree. Although Astorri contr ols the outcome of this 
case because of the similarity of the facts and evidence 
used to support the S 5K2.3 departure, the arguments in 
Judge Hutchinson's dissent ring true. I do not believe that, 
under the correct interpretation of S 5K2.3, the evidence 
before the District Court in this case was sufficiently 
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reliable to support the necessary finding of"psychological 
injury much more serious than that normally resulting 
from commission of the offense"; the evidence simply does 
not sufficiently support a finding of "substantial 
impairment of the intellectual, psychological, emotional, or 
behavioral functioning of a victim . . . [that] manifests itself 
by physical or psychological symptoms or by changes in 
behavior patterns." 
 
Both here and in Astorri, the District Court relied upon 
the conclusory lay statements of the victims (or their 
lawyers) and the court's own observations of the victims to 
support the departure. But the Guidelines (and due 
process) generally require that evidence used in sentencing 
be reliable. See, e.g., United States v. Sciarrino, 884 F.2d 95 
(3d Cir. 1989). I agree with Judge Hutchinson that the type 
of evidence employed in Astorri (and in this case) is 
insufficiently reliable to use as a basis for an upward 
departure under S 5K2.3. More specifically, I believe that 
Judge Hutchinson was correct that, because the 
Sentencing Guidelines generally require an objective basis 
for a departure or enhancement, something mor e than 
conclusory, unsupported lay statements and the District 
Court's "eyeballing" of the victim should be r equired to 
show the requisite impairment of physical, psychological, or 
behavioral functioning and the comparative severity of 
psychological injury. 
 
I do not suggest that expert medical testimony is a 
prerequisite to a S 5K2.3 departur e (although such 
testimony would certainly suffice as objective evidence). I 
do, however, believe that medical evidence is preferable and 
that, in the absence of detailed and truly compelling lay 
reports, some sort of medical evidence from an expert 
should be required--e.g., an affidavit or even a signed letter 
from a health care provider, or the victim's medical records. 
In short, the basis for the departure should be more than 
the naked claims of the victim set forth in a letter . 
 
I believe that we should take up this case en banc to 
overrule Astorri. This issue arises with some degree of 
regularity and surely presents an important question. 
Alternatively, I suggest to the Sentencing Commission that 
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it alter S 5K2.3 (thus effectively overruling Astorri) by adding 
to the end of that Guideline something like the following: 
 
       In the absence of detailed and truly compelling lay 
       testimony from the victim, a departure by the 
       sentencing court under this section should be based 
       upon objective evidence such as an affidavit or signed 
       letter from the victim's health care pr ovider or a 
       verified copy of the victim's medical recor ds. 
 
An amendment along these lines would provide for an 
objective basis for upward departures under S 5K2.3 that 
would make that section consonant with the Guidelines as 
a whole. The clerk will send a copy of this opinion to the 
Chair and General Counsel of the Sentencing Commission. 
 
With these thoughts, I join in the judgment of the Court. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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